Amidst the rapid decrease of
the Japanese Yen since Shinzo Abe won election as Japan’s next prime minister
in December 2012, the fundamentals concerning how the depreciation would impact
global markets practically have been forgotten.
Attention of market
participants has been fixated on Abe-rhetoric, which has driven the yen down
7.2% since December 2012 without any quantitative easing from Japan’s Central
Bank thus far. In fact, Abe’s rhetoric has transformed market sentiment more
successfully than Japan’s last US$100billion attempt to drive the Yen down in
November 2011. Furthermore, market participants see the near future outlook for
the Yen weighing towards further weakening due to:
Will the Sun continue to rise this year? |
1. Japan Central Bank’s
likely stance to utilize monetary easing until an inflation target of at least
2% is achieved;
2. The delay in increasing
the consumption tax will add pressure on Japan’s fiscal position and weigh on
the yen; and
3. Rumours of a ratings
downgrade would likely increase sales of Japanese government bonds and capital
outflows, which would depreciate the yen.
However, an examination of
the fundamentals suggests that Japan’s devaluation of the Yen will not be
allowed to go so far, for both political and economic reasons. Politically,
Shinzo Abe’s rhetoric and ultra-nationalism has provoked neighbouring countries
China, South Korea and Taiwan. Japan and South Korea’s relations soured over
Japan’s decision to celebrate Takeshima Day in February 2013, a celebration
concerning the Takeshima Islands or Dodko (as they are known in South Korea),
as well as continued issues regarding Japan’s refusal to acknowledge its misuse
of Korean comfort women. Japan’s relations have soured with China and Taiwan
over its decision to nationalize the disputed Senkaku Japanese) or Diaoyu
(Chinese) islands last year. Then there is the added competitiveness between
China and Japan as to who is the giant in Asia and the stage is set for
political confrontations. On the economic side of the coin, Japan’s major
trading partners – China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Saudi Arabia –
all have something to lose in a global marketplace with a weaker Yen. A weaker
Yen directly affects these countries’ imports and exports. Furthermore, these
countries all compete with each other in global markets. For example, a cheaper
yen can slow these countries’ export growth to key markets such as the USA and
Eurozone. When one combines the political will of these countries when
confronted by Japan along with the economic detriments for them of a weaker
Yen, there is incentive to negate Japan’s efforts.
The next question then is do
these countries – specifically China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Saudi
Arabia – have the means to resist Japan’s efforts to weaken the Yen. International
capital reserves allow governments to manipulate exchange rates – either to
provide their country with a more favourable economic environment or to buy
domestic currency to protect their country from “hot money”. On the one hand,
Japan has the second largest international capital reserves in the world at
US$1,321,000 million. However, just considering China’s reserves alone, nearly
double Japan’s at US$2,453,550 million, suggests the means to counter Japan’s
Central Bank. In addition, Saudi Arabia have the fourth largest reserves (US$418,000
million), Taiwan have the sixth largest (US$360,230 million), South Korea have
the eighth largest (US$316,000 million), and Hong Kong have the tenth largest
(US$295,000 million). Combined, this is a potent arsenal to arrest Japan’s depreciating
yen. My proposition is that they won’t let the repercussions of a weaker Yen
last long and therefore a contrarian bet against the Japanese Yen is an
attractive play.
The recent slight increase in
the Yen’s value to 91.60 against the USD, from a low of 94.99, may just be a
market correction. However, it may also signal testing of Japan’s strength and
commitment to intervene to weaken the Yen. Once the Japanese Central Bank is
installed with a governor conducive to Shinzo Abe’s vision of a weaker Yen and
they begin a concerted campaign of unlimited quantitative easing, we may see a
concerted effort from China, perhaps with implicit cooperation from other
affected states such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan, to
combat their attempts. Although they may be unlikely allies, these countries
could be united by a common cause – game theory suggests that cooperation would
save them more of their individual capital reserves than if they acted alone. Therefore,
be a surfer, watch the ocean, and figure out where the big waves are breaking.
And adjust accordingly.
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